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THREE-PERSON IMPARTIAL AVOIDANCE GAMES FOR GENERATING
FINITE CYCLIC, DIHEDRAL, AND NILPOTENT GROUPS
BRET J. BENESH AND MARISA R. GAETZ
Abstract. We study a three-player variation of the impartial avoidance game introduced by
Anderson and Harary. Three players take turns selecting previously-unselected elements of a finite
group. The losing player is the one who selects an element that causes the set of jointly-selected
elements to be a generating set for the group, with the previous player winning and the remaining
player coming in second place. We describe the winning strategy for these games on cyclic, dihedral,
and nilpotent groups.
1. Introduction
The game Do Not Generate was introduced by Anderson and Harary [1]. In this game, two
players take turns selecting previously unselected elements of a finite group until the group is
generated by the jointly-selected elements. The losing player is the first player who selects an
element that causes the jointly-selected elements to generate the entire group. The strategies and
nim-numbers for these games were classified in [2]. We will assume that all groups are nontrivial,
since Do Not Generate cannot be played on the trivial group, as the empty set generates the entire
group in this case.
We modify this game to include three players. The player who generates the group still loses,
but we will define the person who plays immediately before the loser to be the winner and the
remaining player to be the runner-up. This ranking gives each player a preference for which of
the opponents should win, and a player will help her preferred opponent win if she cannot ensure
victory for herself. This has the effect that a player may have a winning strategy because of what
the previous player does, rather than what the player herself does.
The intuition for the game follows. Once the game is over, the players will realize that they
simply took turns selecting elements from a single maximal subgroup M . The first player will win
if |M | ≡ 1 mod 3 with the third player as runner-up, the second will win if |M | ≡ 2 mod 3 with
the first player as runner-up, and the third will win if |M | is divisible by 3 with the second player
as runner-up.
The explanations for this game rely on Lagrange’s Theorem and Cauchy’s Theorem from ele-
mentary group theory. Let G be a finite group and p be a prime number dividing |G|. Cauchy’s
Theorem guarantees there is an element x of order p in G, and Lagrange’s Theorem then guaran-
tees that the final maximal subgroup of the game will be divisible by p if x is ever selected. In
particular, Player 3 will be guaranteed victory by Lagrange’s Theorem once an element of order
3 is played, and the existence of such an element is guaranteed by Cauchy’s Theorem if 3 divides
the order of the group.
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2. Cyclic groups
We start by considering a cyclic group G with generator g and order n. It is well-known that
every maximal subgroup M of G has order n/p for some prime p in this case. So in the case of
cyclic groups, Player 1 can pick the final maximal subgroup by selecting gp to generate a maximal
subgroup of order n/p for some prime p. This allows us to conclude the following.
Theorem 2.1. Let G be a nontrivial finite cyclic group of order n.
(1) If n ≡ 1 mod 3 and there is a prime number p dividing n such that p ≡ 1 mod 3, then
Player 1 has a winning strategy.
(2) If n ≡ 1 mod 3 and every prime number p dividing n is such that p ≡ 2 mod 3, then
Player 2 has a winning strategy.
(3) If n ≡ 2 mod 3, then Player 1 has a winning strategy.
(4) If n ≡ 0 mod 9, then Player 3 has a winning strategy.
(5) If n ≡ 3 mod 9, then Player 1 has a winning strategy.
(6) If n ≡ 6 mod 9, then Player 2 has a winning strategy.
Proof. Every maximal subgroup has order n/p for some prime divisor p of n. If n ≡ 1 mod 3
and there is a prime divisor p of n such that p ≡ 1 mod 3, then Player 1 can generate a maximal
subgroup 〈gp〉 of order n/p ≡ 1 mod 3 to win. Similarly, Player 1 can win by choosing gp for any
prime p ≡ 2 mod 3 if n ≡ 2 mod 3 (such a prime p must exist, since n would be equivalent to 0
or 1 modulo 3 otherwise), and Player 1 can win by choosing g3 if n ≡ 3 mod 9.
If n ≡ 1 mod 3 and every prime p dividing n is such that p ≡ 2 mod 3, then every maximal
subgroup will have order n/p ≡ 2 mod 3 for some prime divisor p of n. Therefore, Player 2 will
win, regardless of strategy. If n ≡ 6 mod 9, then n/3 ≡ 2 mod 3 and n/p ≡ 0 mod 3 for every
prime divisor p of n that is not 3. Then Player 1 will choose g3 to generate a maximal subgroup of
order n/3 ≡ 2 mod 3 so that Player 2 wins and Player 1 is runner-up. Finally, if n ≡ 0 mod 9,
then n/p ≡ 0 mod 3 for any prime divisor p of n, including p = 3. In this case, Player 3 wins.

3. Dihedral groups
Let Dn denote a dihedral group of order 2n. We start with a statement about the maximal
subgroups of Dn, which follows easily from the well-known fact that every subgroup of a dihedral
group is either cyclic or dihedral.
Proposition 3.1. If M is a maximal subgroup of a dihedral group Dn, then either |M | = n or
|M | = 2n/p for some prime p dividing n.
We can now determine the outcomes of the avoidance game on dihedral groups by considering
the orders of maximal subgroups.
Theorem 3.2. Let Dn be a dihedral group. Then
(1) Player 1 has a winning strategy if and only if n ≡ 1 mod 3.
(2) Player 2 has a winning strategy if and only if n ≡ 2 mod 3 or n ≡ 3 mod 9.
(3) Player 3 has a winning strategy if and only if n ≡ 0 mod 9 or n ≡ 6 mod 9.
Proof. Let r generate the cyclic subgroup of rotations of Dn. Suppose that n ≡ 1 mod 3. Then
Player 1 can win by selecting r to generate a subgroup of order n ≡ 1 mod 3. Now suppose that
n ≡ 2 mod 3, in which case n must have a prime divisor q such that q ≡ 2 mod 3. If Player 1
chooses a rotation, then Player 2 can choose either r (or the identity, if Player 1 chooses r) to
generate the cyclic maximal subgroup of order n. If Player 1 chooses a reflection f , then Player 2
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can choose the rotation rq. Then 〈f, rq〉 ∼= Dn/q is maximal with |〈f, r
q〉| = 2n/q ≡ 2(2)/2 = 2
mod 3. Therefore, Player 2 has a winning strategy if n ≡ 2 mod 3.
Recall that every maximal subgroup of Dn has order n, 2n/p for some prime divisor p 6= 3
of n, or 2n/3 by Proposition 3.1. If n ≡ 0 mod 9, every possible order of a maximal subgroup
is divisible by 3, so Player 3 will win this game regardless of strategy. If n ≡ 3 mod 9, then
n ≡ 0 mod 3, 2n/3 ≡ 2 mod 3, and 2n/p ≡ 0 mod 3 for all primes p not equal to 3 that divide
n. Therefore, either Player 2 or Player 3 will win. Because Player 1 prefers that Player 2 wins,
Player 1 can select an element that generates a subgroup of the cyclic rotations of order n/3, and
Player 2 can select any reflection to generate a maximal subgroup of order 2n/3 ≡ 2 mod 3.
Finally, assume that n ≡ 6 mod 9. Then n ≡ 0 mod 3, 2n/3 ≡ 1 mod 3, and 2n/p ≡ 0
mod 3 for all primes p dividing n that are not 3. Therefore, either Player 1 or Player 3 will
win, although Player 1 cannot win on the first turn because maximal subgroups of order 2n/3
are not cyclic. Because Player 2 prefers that Player 3 wins, Player 2 will ensure a victory for
Player 3. If Player 1 selects a rotation, Player 2 will select a generating rotation to create a
maximal subgroup of order n ≡ 0 mod 3. If Player 1 selects a reflection f , then Player 2 will
select a rotation x that generates a rotation subgroup of order 2n/p for any prime p not equal to
3. Then |〈f, x〉| = 2n/p ≡ 2(0)/p ≡ 0 mod 3, ensuring victory for Player 3. 
4. Nilpotent groups
Recall that nilpotent groups are a generalization of abelian groups and have the following
properties.
Theorem 4.1. [3, Theorem 8.19] Let G be a finite group. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) G is nilpotent.
(2) Every maximal subgroup of G is normal in G.
(3) G is isomorphic to a direct product of its Sylow subgroups.
Proposition 4.2. [3, Problem 8.11] If M is a maximal subgroup of a finite nilpotent group G,
then |M | = |G|/p for some prime divisor p of |G|.
We will let d(G) denote the size of a minimal generating set of a group G. We can now determine
the outcomes of the avoidance game on finite nilpotent groups by considering the orders of maximal
subgroups.
Theorem 4.3. Let G be a nontrivial finite nilpotent group, and let H be the direct product of
Sylow q-groups of G such that q ≡ 1 mod 3 and K be the direct product of Sylow r-groups of G
such that r ≡ 2 mod 3.
(1) Player 1 has a winning strategy in the following cases.
(a) |G| ≡ 1 mod 3 and 2d(H) ≥ d(K) + 1
(b) |G| ≡ 2 mod 3 and 2d(K) ≥ d(H) + 1
(c) |G| ≡ 3 mod 9 and d(G) = 1
(2) Player 2 has a winning strategy in the following cases.
(a) |G| ≡ 1 mod 3 and 2d(H) < d(K) + 1
(b) |G| ≡ 2 mod 3 and 2d(K) < d(H) + 1
(c) |G| ≡ 6 mod 9 and d(G) ≤ 2
(3) Player 3 has a winning strategy in the following cases.
(a) |G| ≡ 0 mod 9
(b) |G| ≡ 3 mod 9 and d(G) ≥ 2
(c) |G| ≡ 6 mod 9 and d(G) ≥ 3
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Proof. First, note that these results agree with those from Theorem 2.1 in the case that d(G) = 1.
The only nontrivial observations to make are first that d(K) = 1 and d(H) ∈ {0, 1} if |G| ≡ 2
mod 3, and second that, when |G| ≡ 1 mod 3, d(H) = 0 if and only if every prime number p
dividing G is equivalent to 2 modulo 3. So assume that d(G) ≥ 2.
If |G| ≡ 0 mod 9, then |G|/p ≡ 0 mod 3 for all such p dividing |G|, including p = 3. Therefore,
Player 3 has a winning strategy.
Let T denote the Sylow 3-subgroup of G for the remainder of the proof, and suppose for the
remainder of the paragraph that |G| ≡ 3 mod 9 so that |T | = 3 and |H ×K| ≡ 1 mod 3. This
implies that d(H ×K) ≥ 2, lest G be cyclic. The maximal subgroups must each have order either
|G|/3 = |H ×K| ≡ 1 mod 3 or |G|/p ≡ 0 mod 3 for some prime p dividing |G|. Thus Player 2
cannot win and will instead help Player 3 win. Suppose Player 1 selects x ∈ G. If 3 divides |〈x〉|,
then Player 3 will win. Otherwise, Player 2 can select a nontrivial element t of T , which is a legal
play because 〈x, t〉 = 〈t〉 × 〈x〉 < T × (H ×K) = G since d(H ×K) ≥ 2. This guarantees victory
for Player 3.
Now suppose that d(G) = 2 and |G| ≡ 6 mod 9. Again |T | = 3, but now |H ×K| ≡ 2 mod 3
with d(H × K) = 2, lest G be cyclic. The maximal subgroups must each have order |G|/3 ≡ 2
mod 3 or |G|/p ≡ 0 mod 3 for some prime p dividing |G|. Thus Player 1 cannot win and will
instead help Player 2 win. Then Player 1 and Player 2 can each choose a generator of H × K,
which will result in a maximal subgroup of order |H×K| = |G|/3 ≡ 2 mod 3 since d(H×K) = 2.
Therefore, Player 2 has a winning strategy.
So now suppose that d(G) ≥ 3 and |G| ≡ 6 mod 9. Again, |T | = 3 and d(H × K) ≥ 3
since d(G) ≥ 3. Suppose Players 1 and 2 choose the elements x, y ∈ G. If 3 divides |〈x, y〉|,
then Player 3 will win. Otherwise, Player 3 can choose a nontrivial element t of T so that
〈t, x, y〉 = 〈t〉 × 〈x, y〉 = T × 〈x, y〉 < T × (H ×K) = G since d(H ×K) ≥ 3. Therefore, Player 3
has not generated G, and every maximal subgroup containing 〈x, y, t〉 will have order divisible by
3, which guarantees victory for Player 3.
Therefore, we may assume that 3 does not divide |G| and T is trivial, which means that Player 3
cannot win. Then Player 3 will help Player 1 and, after the first two elements are selected, Player 1
effectively selects two elements for every element Player 2 selects an element since Player 3 helps
Player 1. The game will end with a maximal subgroup M of order |G|/p for some prime p dividing
|G|. If |G| ≡ 1 mod 3, then Player 1 (and hence, Player 3) wants p ≡ 1 mod 3 and Player 2 wants
p ≡ 2 mod 3. Player 1’s strategy will be to choose elements to generate K, since K ≤M implies
that |G|/p = |M | ≡ 1 mod 3 for some p corresponding to a Sylow subgroup in H . Player 2’s
strategy will be to generate H for similar reasons. Because Player 1 essentially gets to choose two
generators of K for every generator of H that Player 2 chooses, we see after some simple algebra
that Player 1 (with Player 3’s help) will be able to generate K before Player 2 can generate H if
and only if 2d(H) ≥ d(K)+1. A similar argument shows that Player 1 wins when |G| ≡ 2 mod 3
if and only if 2d(K) ≥ d(H) + 1.

5. General Results
Our first result demonstrates conditions under which Player 3 is guaranteed victory.
Proposition 5.1. If G is a finite group such that 3 divides |G| and d(G) ≥ 4, then Player 3 has
a winning strategy.
Proof. Suppose that Players 1 and 2 select elements x and y on the first two turns. By Cauchy’s
Theorem, there is an element t of order 3 in G, and 〈x, y, t〉 < G since d(G) ≥ 4. Then Player 3
wins by selecting t, since t will be in the final maximal subgroup M of the game ensuring that
|M | ≡ 0 mod 3. 
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Our next result depends on some definitions. Let G be a noncyclic finite group, and denote the
set of maximal subgroups of G by M. We say that a subset X of M n-covers G if for every n
elements g1, . . . , gn ∈ G, there is a maximal subgroup M ∈ X such that g1, . . . , gn ∈ M . We let
M3 be the maximal subgroups of G with orders divisible by 3. We offer a first approximation for
the 3-player analogue to the main theorems in [2] below.
Theorem 5.2. Let G be a finite group. Then
(1) If M3 2-covers G, then Player 3 has a winning strategy.
(2) If M3 1-covers G but does not 2-cover G, then Player 1 does not have a winning strategy.
(3) Otherwise, Player 3 does not have a winning strategy.
Proof. Suppose thatM3 2-covers G and Players 1 and 2 select element x and y of G initially. Since
M3 2-covers G, there is a maximal subgroup M ∈ M3 such that x, y ∈ M . Then Player 3 can
select any element of order 3 in M to ensure that the game’s final maximal subgroup is divisible
by 3.
Now suppose that M3 covers G but does not 2-cover G and Player 1 selects an element x of G
initially. Because M3 1-covers G, there is a maximal subgroup M containing x. Player 2 does not
want Player 1 to win, so Player 2 will either choose an element that ensures victory for herself or
select an element of order 3 from M to ensure that Player 1 does not win.
Now assume that M3 does not cover G. Then Player 1 can choose an element not contained in
∪M3 to ensure that Player 3 does not win. 
6. Further Questions
We close with some open questions.
(1) What are the strategies and outcomes for groups other than cyclic, dihedral, and nilpotent
groups?
(2) Can we generalize these methods for the analogous game involving p players for some prime
p? This will allow us to still use Cauchy’s Theorem.
(3) Can we generalize these results for the analogous game involving n players for any n ≥ 4?
(4) What are the winning strategies in the analogous achievement game where the player who
generates the group wins, rather than loses?
(5) Can we improve the statements of Items 2 and 3 of Theorem 5.2 to determine exactly
which player wins in each case?
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